In 6 experiments, the authors examined the use of prior knowledge in category learning. Previous studies of the effects of knowledge on category learning have used categories in which knowledge was related to all of the category's features. However, people's knowledge of real-world categories often consists of many "rote" features that are not related to their prior knowledge. Five experiments found that even minimal prior knowledge (1 knowledge-relevant feature and 5 rote features per exemplar) can facilitate category learning. Posttests revealed that although the knowledge aided learning, subjects also acquired the rote features that were not related to knowledge, contradicting predictions of an attentional explanation of the knowledge effect. The results of Experiment 6 suggested that subjects attempt to link even rote features to their knowledge.
When people learn a new category, they are influenced by both the properties of the observed category exemplars and their knowledge about the category's domain. Learning is easier when prior knowledge is consistent with a category that is to be learned than when knowledge is inconsistent or simply absent (Murphy & Allopenna, 1994; Pazzani, 1991; Wattenmaker, Dewey, T. Murphy, & Medin, 1986) . By prior knowledge we mean knowledge about a broad domain, such as animals, birds, vehicles, or computers, that exists before learning a new category. This knowledge connects features of a new category, perhaps through causal relations, and provides some sort of explanation of why the category has the properties it does (see Carey, 1985; Keil, 1989; Murphy, 1993, in press; Murphy & Medin, 1985) . To give a very simple example: People have some idea about how animals fly that provides a possible explanation for why something that has wings can live high on a cliff--the wings explain flying, which in turn explains why this habitat is possible. Such prior knowledge contrasts with category structure: empirical or statistical information about a category of the sort "most of the category members have wings" or "one of the exemplars has a red back, wings, and three legs." Both sources of information are used in much category learning, as one cannot rely solely on prior knowledge in learning something new, and yet such knowledge can greatly speed learning when it is correct.
One of the main issues facing the psychology of concepts is to understand how prior knowledge influences category learning. Although it seems intuitively obvious that such knowledge can aid Audrey S. Kaplan and Gregory L. Murphy, Department of Psychology and Beckman Institute, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
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Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Gregory L. Murphy, Beckman Institute, University of Illinois, 405 North Mathews Avenue, Urbana, Illinois 61801. Electronic mail may be sent to gmurphy@ s.psych.niuc.edu. learning, the mechanism by which knowledge aids learning and how it affects the category representation is not yet understood. Much of the best-known research on knowledge effects in concepts has been carried out on real concepts that the subjects already know, investigating issues such as expertise and culture; natural kinds versus artifacts; essentialism; and goal-derived categories (Barsalou, 1991; Bloom, 1996; Boster & Johnson, 1989; Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Keil, 1989; Malt, 1990; Medin & Atran, 1999; Medin, Lynch, Coley & Atran, 1997; Ross & Murphy, 1999; among others) . This research has suggested that knowledge profoundly affects conceptual structure. However, descriptive studies of real-world categories are less successful in revealing the mechanisms of category learning that may have led to the obtained conceptual structures. For example, it is often quite difficult in such studies to separate the influence of culture or knowledge from other differences between subject populations. Are expertise effects due to background knowledge or to experts' greater experience with category exemplars? Do cultures differ because of their beliefs or their environments? Furthermore, such studies usually do not address the learning process itself. As in other areas of psychology, primarily correlational studies of natural domains and experimental studies of artificial materials have complementary strengths and weaknesses, and both may be necessary to come to a complete understanding of how knowledge influences concept learning. The present research uses the experimental study of novel category acquisition to investigate how knowledge affects what is learned about a category.
In the experiments reported here, we had two specific goals. We argue that natural concepts generally do not have all (or perhaps even mostly) knowledge-related properties, and yet most experimental studies in this area have used such categories. Thus, our first goal was to test the influence of knowledge in categories that are not dominated by knowledge-related features. Our second goal was to investigate accounts of how knowledge influences learning. In particular, we investigated an explanation that prior knowledge interferes with learning of empirical category structure. By using categories that were not dominated by knowledge-related features, we were able to investigate the specific effects of knowledge on what is learned.
Knowledge Influences in Previous Experimental Studies of Category Learning
Past research investigating the role of prior knowledge has found strong effects on learning artificial categories. For example, Murphy and Allopenna (1994) examined how subjects learned categories with and without a theme (or schema) that served to connect the category's features. They contrasted categories with features that could be related by a theme, such as "underwater building" or "space building," with categories that could not be related by such themes, keeping category structure constant. They found that such a theme greatly sped up category learning, presumably because it served to integrate the category's properties. Themes have also been shown to facilitate the formation of family resemblance categories in a category construction task in which subjects sort the items into the categories they find most natural (Ahn, 1991; Kaplan & Murphy, 1999; Spalding & Murphy, 1996) . Without themes, subjects usually constructed categories using a single dimension; with themes, they relied on many different dimensions. Thus, the knowledge embodied in the theme qualitatively changed the structure of the category constructed. Furthermore, subjects could spontaneously identify the themes through the features of the categories even when there were no hints or rifles to evoke this knowledge.
Nonetheless, there is an important limitation on this past work, namely, that when knowledge was useful, it related all the features of the concept. For example, Murphy and AUopenna (1994) used a category structure that had statistically relevant features that were associated with a category and irrelevant features that were not. The knowledge related all and only the relevant features of the categories. An analogous situation is true in a number of other prior experiments on knowledge effects (e.g., Ahn, 1991; Pazzani, 1991; Wattenmaker et al., 1986) . Other experiments have not used all knowledge-based features (e.g., Wisniewski, 1995) , but typically, they have not then examined whether such knowledge improves category learning but instead compared features that were or were not related to the knowledge.
In real life, prior knowledge does not always encompass every feature that people learn about a category. For example, most people can think fairly easily of an explanation for why birds have wings, but they do not have an immediate explanation for why birds have a beak instead of lips and teeth. Most people's background knowledge does not explain why a bluejay is blue and a cardinal is red, rather than vice versa. If a number of a category's features are not related to prior knowledge, it is possible that knowledge will not aid learning. Features of the category with no obvious connections to a possible theme could act as a disconfirmarion of the category having that theme (indeed, Spalding & Murphy, 1996 , found such a result in category construction). Thus, learners may not abstract and use the theme. Alternatively, learners may retain the theme as partly correct but not rely on it during learning, since it does not explain much of the concept. In either case, background knowledge would not benefit learning.
The present experiments investigated this question by using categories in which the majority of a category's features were not related to knowledge. The categories contained both rote properties, features that are not readily connected to prior knowledge (which are presumably learned "by rote"), and knowledge-related properties. The rote properties predominated in our categories, as may be true of many real-life categories. If knowledge effects cannot be found when the knowledge subsumes a minority of a concept's features, this would cast doubt on the more general claim that knowledge normally influences concept acquisition.
Mechanisms of Knowledge Effects
If most everyday concepts have a mixture of rote and knowledge-related properties, as we have suggested, one possible outcome is that the knowledge will influence the acquisition of only the properties that are directly related to it. Alternatively, the knowledge might benefit other features as well, or it might hurt learning of features that are not related to it. These possibilities all raise the question of exactly how knowledge influences learning in the standard category-acquisition task.
One common explanation of knowledge effects is that knowledge directs attention toward certain features at the expense of others (Murphy & Medin, 1985; Pazzani, 1991; Wisniewski, 1995) . This suggestion has been taken up in more formal models as well. Pazzani's PostHoc model preferentially selected properties that were related to the category theme when forming a category representation. If these properties accurately predicted categorization, the model did not learn other properties. Kruschke (1993, p. 87) suggested that knowledge effects could be explained in his connectionist model by higher initial weights on stimulus dimensions that were related to prior knowledge. Such a model would learn more about knowledge-related dimensions than about other dimensions, since learning in this model is competitive. That is, if features like "has wings" and "flies" have high weights and accurately serve to categorize objects as birds, the model would not form as strong associations to other, equally predictive features that are not related to prior knowledge, such as "has a beak.,,1 In short, such attentional focus explanations argue that knowledge and rote features are in competition, and so the use of knowledge would inhibit learning of rote features. (Heit, 1998 , has made a related proposal regarding attention to whole exemplars that are consistent or inconsistent with prior knowledge, though the present experiments did not use such items.)
A somewhat different route to the same prediction was taken by Murphy and Allopenna (1994) . They suggested that when subjects discover some explanation for features of a category, they stop attending to rote features and may simply rely on the explanation to categorize items. As a result, the knowledge inhibits learning about the statistical properties of both rote and knowledge-related features. They provided some evidence for this view, showing that when categories were related by knowledge, an important statistical property (feature frequency in the category) had little or no influence on typicality and categorization; for categories without such knowledge, this statistical property had a large effect. Murphy and Allopenna concluded that noticing a theme for the category turned off empirical learning. However, this demonstration was again in the context of comparing categories that were composed entirely of knowledge-related features versus no such features. Furthermore, later experiments (Spalding & Murphy, 1999) have suggested that subjects did learn the statistical structures of i We thank Bob Rehder for pointing this out and for sharing the results of his simulations, which also confLrmed this point. these categories but simply chose not to use this information when knowledge was present. Nonetheless, it can be seen that a number of researchers have proposed that knowledge of a category is in competition with more mundane empirical learning of a category's properties. If this argument is correct, then subjects who benefit from knowledge in a category should not learn much about the rote features; and they should learn significantly less about such features than do subjects who do not have any knowledge about the category.
An alternative proposal is that knowledge may actually benefit learning the rote properties of a category, because knowledgerelated features may ease categorization, which in turn leaves more processing capacity for learning rote features. For example, if one can easily identify sommething as a bird because it has wings and can fly (knowledge-related properties), one might then be better able to notice its beak (a rote property) and learn the fact that birds tend to have beaks as well. In contrast, when one has little knowledge, one's guesses about category membership are less accurate, leading to less efficient learning of the features. (Indeed, it often takes subjects a very long time to learn categories in artificial category-learning experiments; see Murphy & Allopenna, 1994.) A final possibility is that learners may attempt to connect the rote properties to the underlying knowledge. In many cases, it is possible to fathom some connection between two properties that the experimenters did not intend to be related. Thus, the "rote" features may not in fact be learned by rote but by being integrated with knowledge. Even the attempt to make such links may aid in learning the rote features. That is, when one starts to wonder "why is it that animals with wings have a beak?" one may be learning that birds have beaks even if one doesn't arrive at a satisfactory answer. This explanation, then, suggests that learners attempt to integrate the rote features into the knowledge structure, which aids learning.
Evidence for this proposal may be found in studies using the category construction task. Kaplan and Murphy (1999) found that when subjects studied items that had both knowledge-related and rote features, they were better able to identify the category structure than when no knowledge was present. Not only did the subjects recover the categories correctly when knowledge was present, a later test showed that they had also learned the statistical relations among the rote features better. Category construction differs from the standard category-learning task used in the present studies in a number of respects, however (see Lassaline & Murphy, 1996 , for discussion). In particular, when subjects are able to use knowledge to get the right answer in the categorization task, they may not be motivated to learn more about the categories. (There is no "right answer" in the construction task, because there is no feedback.) This is one reason why Murphy and Allopenna (1994) suggested that subjects would be unlikely to learn detailed category Structure when knowledge is sufficient to perform the task. That view is also consistent with error-driven learning algorithms; since if knowledge-related features are sufficient to classify the items, there is no error left to spur learning of the rote features.
The present experiments, therefore, investigate the question of how knowledge benefits learning, and whether that benefit is confined to the subset of features directly related to the knowledge. The results will speak to both theoretical questions of how knowledge influences category learning and the important empirical question of whether knowledge influences learning when much of the category cannot be easily related to that knowledge.
Experiment 1 investigated whether a small amount of knowledge aids category learning. Experiments 2, 3, and 5 compared the learning of rote and knowledge-related features to investigate the attentional focus and other hypotheses of how knowledge influences learning. Experiment 4 asked how early during learning knowledge has an effect. Experiment 6 investigated the specific possibility that learners attempt to relate even rote features to background knowledge during learning.
Experiment 1
To date, most experiments on prior knowledge and category learning have used categories in which each exemplar had several knowledge-relevant features. The current experiments introduced themes in a subtler manner: Here, each exemplar consisted of six features, five of which were not related to prior knowledge (nonthematic features), and one of which was related to prior knowledge (the thematic feature). The categories followed a factorial structure shown in Table 1 under "Characteristic." This structure has been used in much prior research on categorization (e.g., Ahn, 1991; Medin, Wattenmaker, & Hampson, 1987; Regehr & Brooks, 1995) . Each of the columns labeled D1 through D5 in Table 1 refers to a dimension that can be instantiated as one of two feature values, denoted here as 0s and Is. The 0s and ls are called characteristic features because each feature represented by either 0 or 1 is more characteristic of one of the two categories (Is are more characteristic of Category A, 0s are more characteristic of In addition, each exemplar had one idiosyncratic feature that occurred in it alone (denoted by lowercase al-a6 and bl-b6 in Table 1 ). Thus, each exemplar consisted of five characteristic features plus one idiosyncratic feature. It was this idiosyncratic feature that was related to a theme or knowledge structure. For vehicle categories, we used features that were related to arctic use or tropical use; for animals, the themes were predatory versus prey animals; for buildings, we used features related to a building in space and a building under the sea. For example, features associated with the underwater theme were things like "divers live there," "has thick walls," and "you get there by submarine." These thematic features were derived from past experiments in our laboratory (e.g., Murphy & Allopenna, 1994; Spalding & Murphy, 1996) that had shown significant effects of prior knowledge. However, in those experiments, each feature occurred many times across exemplars, and every exemplar included many such features. In the present experiments, subjects had to remember the single knowledge-relevant feature in one item and relate it to a different knowledge-relevant feature in another item if they were to notice and use the theme. 2 The goal of Experiment 1 was simply to discover whether knowledge aids learning in these circumstances.
There are several reasons to think that this amount of prior knowledge will not be enough to help subjects learn the categories. First, the total proportion of theme-related features per item is very small--only 1 out of 6 features. Second, the theme can only be identified by integrating the related features across exemplars. That is, unlike previous experiments, there is little in any one exemplar to give subjects the idea that the categories differ according to theme. Subjects are unlikely to study an item with a single theme-related feature, "thick walls," say, and think "Oh, these must be underwater buildings." Instead, subjects would have to remember the idiosyncratic properties (which do not recur across exemplars) and notice the theme that connects these features (but not the others) across items. That is, upon seeing the exemplar with "thick walls" and another item two trials later with "divers live there," the subjects might think, "Some of these seem like underwater buildings." Third, subjects can learn the categories by using the more frequent characteristic features, which have a clear-cut family resemblance structure. A major issue investigated here, then, is whether subjects will notice the themes based on minimal information, and whether this will happen soon enough to benefit category learning, which could be accomplished through purely empirical means (the characteristic features).
To discover whether subjects were sensitive to this small amount of knowledge in learning the categories, we compared two distributions of idiosyncratic features. In the intact theme condition, all of the idiosyncratic features in a given category were derived from the same theme. Note that in Table 1 , all intact theme idiosyncratic features within Category A begin with lowercase a, indicating the A theme, and similarly for Category B. In the mixed theme condition, half of the idiosyncratic features were derived in each category from one theme and half were derived from the contrasting theme (denoted by both lowercase a and b idiosyncratic features within each category in the mixed theme idiosyncratic column in Table 1 ). For example, the idiosyncratic features for one of the mixed theme building categories were: "deep-sea research is carried out there," "astronauts live there," "it's under the water," "get there by plane," "fish are kept there as pets," and "has thin, light walls." The characteristic features (the ls and 0s in Table 1 ) were the same in both cases.
If subjects find the intact theme categories easier to learn than the mixed theme categories, this will indicate that they are abstracting the thematic information and using it to aid learning of the categories, even though there is only one thematic feature per item.
Me~od
Subjects. Twenty-four University of Illinois undergraduates participated in this experiment, for partial class credit or for pay. They were randomly assigned to the six conditions created by crossing knowledge condition (intact theme vs. mixed theme) with domain (animal, building, or vehicle) .
Materials and design. The categories used in this experiment followed the factorial structure depicted in Table 1 . Each category had six exemplars, and each exemplar had six features. The features of Dimensions 1-5 were nonthematic, but they were all derived from the same domain (animals, buildings, or vehicles) within a pair of categories. The idiosyncratic features were derived from specific themes. In the intact theme conditions, all six of the idiosyncratic features within a category were derived from one theme, and the idiosyncratic features of the contrasting category were derived from a different theme. For example, the idiosyncratic features of Category A might have been derived from the underwater building theme and the idiosyncratic features of Category B might have been derived from the space building theme. In the mixed theme condition, three of the idiosyncratic features in a given category were derived from one theme and three were derived from the contrasting theme. The characteristic features (the ls and 0s in Table 1 ) were identical in the two conditions, and the same idiosyncratic features were used; only the distribution of the idiosyncratic features distinguished the intact theme categories from the mixed theme ones. A complete list of the features used in this experiment can be found in the Appendix.
Procedure. Subjects learned a single pair of categories on a computer. The categories were given the names "Dax" and "Kez." On each trial, the subject pressed the space bar, which caused an exemplar to appear on the screen. The order of the features was randomized on each presentation of an exemplar, to prevent order information from being a cue. Subjects had 15 s to decide whether the item was a Dax or a Kez, indicated by pressing the D or K key. Next, a "Correct" or "Incorrect" message appeared, 2 In the design used here, the idiosyncratic features were the thematic features (i.e., related to a common knowledge structure). Although idiosyncratic and thematic features refer to the same features in the present experiment, these terms are not synonyms, because the former refers to the structural aspect of the feature, and the latter refers to its relation to knowledge. The two coincide here, but in other experiments in our laboratory (and see Experiments 3 and 4) the idiosyncratic features were not thematic. We tend to use the terms idiosyncratic and characteristic when focusing on the structural aspect of a feature, and thematic and rote when focusing on the knowledge relation, though we often use both for clarity.
followed by the exemplar with the correct category name written above it. This labeled exemplar remained on the screen for t0 s so that the subjects could study the correct answer. Each block of trials contained all 12 exemplars in a random order. Learning continued until the subject correctly classified all exemplars within the same block or until 14 blocks had been completed. (Subjects who did not learn were given a score of 15 blocks.) After reaching criterion, the subjects completed a short questionnaire to determine what they had learned about the categories. Subjects were asked to list the features of Daxes and Kezes and to say how they went about learning to tell the categories apart.
Results
The main question was whether the intact theme categories were learned more easily than the mixed theme categories. Because differences between domains were not of interest, we collapsed across domain in reporting results from all the experiments (preliminary analyses indicated that there were no effects involving domain in these experiments, with an exception in Experiment 2, which is noted). In this experiment, the intact theme categories were learned in fewer blocks, M = 4.1, than the mixed theme categories, M = 9.9, F(1, 22) = 15.61, p < .001, MSE = 13. The total number of errors reflected the same pattern, F(1, 22) = 12.18, p < .005, MSE = 122; subjects in the intact theme condition made an average of 9.4 errors, and subjects in the mixed theme condition made an average of 25.2 errors. Thus, in spite of the minimal number of thematic features, learning was much easier by both measures in the intact theme condition.
The postleaming questionnaires provided insight into what the subjects had learned about the categories. The first two questions asked subjects to list the features that Daxes and Kezes had. The numbers of idiosyncratic and characteristic features listed by subjects were tabulated. Because each category pair contained t0 characteristic and 12 idiosyncratic features, raw frequencies of features were converted to percentages to allow comparison. Subjects in the mixed theme condition listed about half of both kinds of features, 50% of the idiosyncratic (knowledge-related) and 48% of the characteristic (rote) features. Subjects in the intact theme condition listed 50% of the idiosyncratic and 30% of the characteristic features on average. The difference between the percentage of idiosyncratic and characteristic features listed by subjects in the intact theme condition is suggestive, but not reliable, F(1, 11) = 2.80, p = .12, MSE = 0.1. Nevertheless, subjects in the intact theme condition wrote numerically more of the idiosyncratic features than characteristic features when describing the two categories, even though each idiosyncratic feature occurred in only one exemplar (i.e., a sixth of the frequency of the characteristic features). If they had indeed noticed the themes, perhaps they thought that the knowledge-related features were more important to the nature of the categories than the characteristic features were.
The final item on the questionnaire asked subjects to report how they went about learning to distinguish the two categories. Some subjects noticed the family resemblance structure. Other subjects reported using one dimension and making one or two exceptions. Seven of the 12 subjects in the intact theme condition (and only one subject in the mixed theme condition) made explicit mention of the themes in their descriptions. For example, one subject who learned the intact theme vehicle categories wrote, " [Daxes] are warm weather vehicles. They have vinyl seats which are evidently good for warm weather. They are lightly insulated and are made in Africa or for driving on safaris. The Kezes are cold weather vehicles. They have treads or some other cold weather feature. They usually have cloth seat covers and are more insulated than Daxes."
We divided the intact theme subjects into those who mentioned themes and those who did not, to see whether theme detection was related to learning speed. In fact, subjects who mentioned themes took an average of 2.9 blocks to master the categories, compared to an average of 5.8 blocks for the intact theme subjects who did not mention themes, F(1, 10) = 5.3, p < .05, MSE = 4.8, again showing that the themes could be quite useful in this structure.
Discussion
Experiment 1 showed that prior knowledge could aid in category learning even when individual category members contained only one knowledge-related feature (the idiosyncratic feature). When all of the idiosyncratic features within a category were derived from one theme (as in the intact theme condition), subjects learned the categories in half the time compared to when the idiosyncratic features within a category were derived from two competing themes (as in the mixed theme condition). This result suggests that subjects were able to integrate the thematic information over several exemplars in order to notice the themes and use them to team the categories.
Real-world categories no doubt vary in the proportion of their features that can be related to background knowledge. Prior experiments on knowledge effects represent rather extreme cases in which all or most of the features have been related to prior knowledge. In contrast, the categories used in this article reflect the opposite pole in which only one feature per item could be related to prior knowledge. Most real-world categories probably fall somewhere between these two extremes. The important finding from this experiment is that even the lower bound of this continuum confers a large advantage of prior knowledge.
Although using a theme clearly benefited learning, it may simultaneously have carried a cost for the intact theme condition. Even though intact theme subjects learned the categories rapidly, it is unclear how much they learned about them. Specifically, if the thematic features were used to learn the categories, then subjects might not have learned much about the rote, characteristic features (Murphy & Allopenna, 1994) , consistent with the trend in the recall data. These subjects simply didn't have to learn anything further about the characteristic features once they learned the themes. However, there are other possible explanations for the discrepancy between the kinds of features listed by subjects in the two conditions, First, since the intact theme subjects learned the categories in fewer blocks than did subjects in the mixed theme condition, they tended to see the individual features less often than the mixed theme subjects did. Therefore, it is not so surprising that intact theme subjects listed fewer characteristic features than mixed theme subjects did. Also, the theme may have acted as a retrieval cue in this recall task; intact theme subjects might have been able to categorize the characteristic features quite well had they been asked to do so.
Since the mixed theme subjects had more experience with the items, one might wonder why they didn't list more idiosyncratic features as well. It is possible that some mixed theme subjects initially tried to use the themes during learning, but then abandoned this strategy after several classification errors. By the time they had learned the categories, they may have been ignoring the idiosyncratic features for a few blocks. This would decrease the likelihood of listing idiosyncratic features on the postleaming questionnaire. The next experiment investigates in more detail what subjects in the intact and mixed theme conditions learned about each category.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 showed that people could use even small amounts of thematic information to aid category learning. With this result in hand, we can now ask the question of exactly how knowledge is aiding learning. Earlier, we reviewed two general views of this process. On one view, knowledge provides a shortcut to learning the categories, thereby eliminating the need for rote empirical learning. Since every item can be accurately classified by its single knowledge-related feature, little or no additional learning of the rote features is required (Murphy & Allopenna, 1994; Pazzanl, 1991) . More generally, if learners focus on the knowledge-related features, competitive learning procedures would result in less learning of the other features. Thus, the effect of knowledge is to draw attention to and tie together the thematic features, at the expense of the nonthematic features. An alternative view is that knowledge helps to connect all the features of the category, perhaps through releasing attentional resources or through attempts to connect all the features to the category theme. Thus, knowledge would not reduce learning of rote features.
Experiment 2 evaluated these possibilities by investigating just what intact and mixed theme subjects learned about the category's features, using a more sensitive measure than the recall test of Experiment 1. After a standard category learning task, individual features were presented for speeded classification decisions. Subjects had to decide, as quickly and accurately as possible, which category each feature occurred in most often. In addition, subjects rated how confident they felt about each single-feature classification. Reaction times, error rates, and confidence ratings should be sensitive measures of how well individual features have been learned.
If knowledge operates primarily by focusing attention on the knowledge-related features, thereby causing learners to ignore the rote features, two predictions follow. First, the intact theme subjects should learn the idiosyncratic features better than they learn the characteristic features, since only the former are related to the knowledge. Second, the intact theme subjects should learn the idiosyncratic features better than, and the characteristic features worse than, the mixed theme subjects do. Since the mixed theme group has no knowledge to tie the idiosyncratic features together, they are more likely to rely on the characteristic features (the pattern of Is and 0s shown in Table 1 ), which occur more frequently and are statistically reliable predictors of category membership. This experiment, then, investigates in greater detail just what each group has learned about the categories, to better understand how knowledge is having an effect.
A related study was performed by Hayes and Taplin (1992) on school-age children. They gave 6-and 11-year-old children helpful names for the categories they learned. These names were related to two of the four dimensions of the stimuli. Hayes and Taplin found that these names aided learning relative to a control, even though not all dimensions were related to knowledge (though the knowledge included half the dimensions in their study and only one out of six in ours). Most relevantly, in test items, Hayes and Taplin found that the children with knowledge gave high weights to the knowledge-relevant features and low or negative weights to the other features, suggesting that the nonthematic features had little influence on categorization. That is, their results are consistent with the predictions of the attentional focus hypothesis. However, they note that the negative weights could be an artifact of the negative correlation between the two kinds of features in their test items. Experiment 2 avoids this problem by testing each feature separately, thereby providing independent estimates of what was learned about each feature.
Method
Subjects. Twenty-four University of Illinois undergraduates participated either for class credit or for pay. Because the feature classification test would be meaningful only for people who had learned the categories, any subject who did not learn within the 14-block limit was replaced. Three subjects, all in the mixed theme condition, were replaced for this reason.
Materials and procedure. The materials were identical to those used in the previous experiment. The procedure consisted of two phases: category learning and speeded single-feature classification. The category learning procedure was identical to that of the previous experiment. About 1 rain after the end of the learning phase, the single-feature classification phase began. On each trial, a single feature from the categories just learned appeared on the screen. Subjects had to decide, as quickly as possible, which category the feature occurred in most often. Subjects responded by pressing the D and K keys on the keyboard (for Dax and Kez). After making the classification, the question, "How confident are you about that decision?" appeared below the feature along with a rating scale from 1 to 7 where I was labeled very unsure and 7 was labeled very confident. Subjects responded by typing a key from 1 to 7. Two seconds elapsed between trials, giving subjects enough time to return their hands to the D and K keys. Each subject saw all 22 features (5 characteristic and 6 idiosyncratic features from both categories) in a different random order. Single-feature classification decisions, classification reaction times, and confidence ratings were all recorded by the computer.
Resul~
In a replication of the previous experiment, the intact theme categories were learned in fewer blocks, M = 3.7, than were the mixed theme categories, M = 6.7, F(1, 22) = 6.37, p < .05, MSE = 8.48. Although the difference here appears to be less than that in Experiment 1, this reflects the fact that subjects who did not learn the categories were replaced in this experiment (because its focus was the postlearning categorization test) but not in the previous one, in which they were given a score of 15. All 3 of the replaced subjects were in the mixed theme condition. Thus, learning was clearly more difficult in that condition, as in Experiment 1. Unlike in the previous experiment, there was a significant interaction of knowledge condition and domain, whereby there was no difference between the intact and mixed theme categories for the animal domain, but there was the usual intact theme advantage for buildings and vehicles, F(2, 18) = 4.09, p < .05, MSE = 7.00. 3
The feature classification data provided further information on what subjects learned about the categories. Overall, the data supported the hypothesis that intact theme subjects were more sensitive to the idiosyncratic (knowledge-related) features than to characteristic (rote) features. But contrary to the attentional focus account, they also showed a slight advantage over the mixed theme group in the learning of characteristic features.
First, reaction times (RTs) for correct single-feature classifications were analyzed in a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with category condition (intact vs. mixed theme) as a between-subjects factor and feature type (characteristic vs. idiosyncratic) as a within-subjects factor. As shown in Figure 1 , there was a significant interaction between category condition and feature type, F(1, 22) = 10.37, p < .01, MSE = 2,802,553. Neither of the main effects approached significance. Intact theme subjects were significantly faster at correctly classifying idiosyncratic features than they were at classifying characteristic features, t(ll) = 3.75, p < .01. Again, this result shows that intact theme subjects were more sensitive to the thematic features than to the nonthematic ones. No significant difference in RTs to characteristic and idiosyncratic features was observed for mixed theme subjects. In addition, intact theme subjects were marginally faster at correctly categorizing idiosyncratic features than were mixed theme subjects, F(1, 22) = 3.06, p = .09, MSE = 716,104. There was no significant difference between intact and mixed theme subjects' RTs on characteristic features.
The confidence ratings yielded similar results, as shown in Table 2 . An interaction between category condition and feature type was again observed whereby intact theme subjects were much more confident about the idiosyncratic features than they were about the characteristic features, and the mixed theme subjects were equally confident about both kinds of features, F(I, 22) = 4.43, p < .05, MSE = 2.92. Intact theme subjects' confidence ratings were near ceiling for idiosyncratic features and significantly lower for characteristic features, t(ll) = 3.37, p < .01. The mixed theme subjects rated the two feature types virtually identically. Also, intact theme subjects had higher confidence ratings for idiosyncratic features than did mixed theme subjects, Table 2 , were subjected to the same analyses. There was a main effect of category condition, with intact theme subjects showing higher accuracy than mixed theme subjects, F(1, 22) = 4.55, p < .05, MSE = 0.081. There was also a marginally significant main effect of feature type, F(1, 22) = 3.56, p < .08, MSE = 0.13, whereby subjects were more accurate at correctly classifying idiosyncratic than characteristic features. Although the interaction of knowledge condition and feature type was not reliable, F(1, 22) = 1.06, the pattern was similar to that of the other two dependent measures: Intact theme subjects learned the idiosyncratic features better than the mixed theme subjects did, t(22) = 2.64, p < .05, but there was no significant difference between intact and mixed theme subjects' error rates on characteristic features (p > .75). Because only the idiosyncratic features were related to the themes, these results show that the intact theme subjects were more sensitive to the knowledge-related features than the mixed theme subjects were. Surprisingly, the intact theme subjects were just as accurate on the rote (characteristic) features as the mixed theme subjects were. 
Discussion
Experiment 2 replicated the learning difference found in Experiment 1: Even minimal knowledge made category learning easier. The novel results in this experiment came in the posttest that measured exactly what subjects had learned about the two categories. It is perhaps not very surprising that the intact theme group learned the idiosyncratic features so well. Given that they must have used the prior knowledge to gain an advantage in learning, and given that this knowledge was instantiated in the idiosyncratic features, subjects must have learned them in order to gain the knowledge benefit. What is surprising, however, is that the intact theme group also did quite well in learning the nonthematic, characteristic features. They were numerically more accurate than the mixed theme group on these features, though none of the differences between the two groups reached significance on these features. This result is rather surprising given that the intact theme group actually had many fewer learning trials than the mixed theme group did (a difference of 3 blocks = 36 trials), and so they would have been expected to have learned less in general. Since the mixed theme group almost certainly learned the categories by using the characteristic features (since the thematic features did not consistently predict category membership for them), it is puzzling that they did not perform better on these features than the intact theme group, which must have relied primarily on the thematic features, as pointed out above.
These results are not very consistent with the attentional focus hypothesis. Although that view correctly predicted that intact theme subjects would perform better on the knowledge-related than on the rote features, it incorrectly predicted that the mixed theme subjects would outperform the intact theme group on the characteristic features. It also incorrectly predicted that the mixed theme subjects would do better on the characteristic than the idiosyncratic features. In both of these cases, competitive learning would have predicted that the features that subjects attended to would reduce learning of the unattended features, and this did not occur.
What explains the surprisingly good (i.e., not bad) performance of the intact theme group on the rote, characteristic features? One possibility we raised earlier is that subjects recruited the rote features into the theme. Although subjects do abstract and use the theme during learning, rather than being discouraged from learning other features, they attempt to relate nonthematic features to the knowledge. For example, recall that one subject in the intact theme condition in Experiment 1 noted that the tropical vehicles had "vinyl seats which are evidently good for warm weather." However, "vinyl seats" was a characteristic, nonthematic feature in this design. People may be so willing to use knowledge that they incorporate features that were not designed to be thematic into the theme (see Wisniewski &Medin, 1994 ). Experiment 6 examines this possible explanation.
Experiment 3
The previous two experiments showed that consistent knowledge (as in the intact theme group) aids category learning relative to inconsistent knowledge (as in the mixed theme group), but they do not say whether that effect is primarily due to facilitation or inhibition. That is, does the difference between the conditions reflect the benefits of consistent knowledge (aiding the intact theme condition), the harmful effects of inconsistent knowledge (hurting the mixed theme condition), or both? In particular, we were interested in whether having inconsistent knowledge is worse than having no knowledge at all. It might be the case that inconsistent knowledge slows category learning because learners initially try to induce categories that fit with their prior knowledge. Because the mixed theme condition misleadingly evokes prior knowledge that is uncorretated with category membership, this may send learners down the garden path. If so, then our results would be overstating the benefits of knowledge. That is, perhaps knowledge of the category (especially minimal knowledge of the type tested here) does not truly aid learning much compared to the absence of such knowledge--the effect is instead driven by poor performance with the inconsistent knowledge given in the mixed theme condition. If that were true, it would be misleading to say that minimal background knowledge helps learning.
Another possibility is that people immediately notice when their prior knowledge is inconsistent with the categories to be learned. In this case, they would quickly be able to ignore the knowledgerelated features and focus instead on the predictive, characteristic features. On this account, the mixed theme group does not receive interference but simply gains no benefit, since it lacks a helpful theme. Its slowness would be explained by the greater difficulty of purely empirical learning.
Experiment 3 tested these alternatives by comparing the learning of mixed theme categories to the learning of categories that contain no knowledge-related features (the no-theme condition). If inconsistent knowledge garden-paths learners, then the mixed theme categories should be harder to learn than the no-theme categories. However, if subjects quickly notice that the mixed themes are not related to category membership, then we should find no difference between the learning of mixed theme and no-theme categories.
Method
Subjects. Thirty-six University of Illinois undergraduates participated for either class credit or pay. Because the feature classification test would only be meaningful for people who had learned the categories, any subject who did not learn within a 14-block limit was replaced. One no-theme and two mixed theme subjects were replaced for this reason. Subjects were randomly assigned to conditions. Materials and procedure. The mixed theme categories were identical to the ones used in the previous two experiments. The no-theme categories had the same characteristic features as the mixed theme categories, but their idiosyncratic features were not derived from themes. Instead, these features instantiated one of two values on six different nonthematic dimensions. For example, one of the (vehicle) Daxes might have had the feature "Made in Michigan" while one of the Kezes had the feature "Made in Ohio." These features were chosen so that they would not conflict with the other features of the categories (see the Appendix). Thus, each no-theme exemplar contained six nonthematic features, one of which was idiosyncratic to a particular exemplar. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 2.
Results and Discussion
The no-theme categories were learned slightly faster than the mixed theme categories (means = 6.22 and 7.39 blocks, respectively), but this difference did not approach significance, t(34) = 0.892. The same pattern was found in the errors made during learning: No-theme subjects made slightly fewer errors than did mixed theme subjects (13.78 and 18.22 errors, respectively), t(34) = 1.10, ns. The single-feature classification data corroborate this finding. Because the two conditions had different idiosyncratic features (unlike in Experiment 2), we did not analyze RTs, as the times to read the properties could not have been equated across conditions. However, the single-feature classification errors were analyzed as before. Computer error resulted in the loss of the single-feature data for four subjects, two in each condition. There were no main effects of category condition or feature type, and there was no interaction (all Fs < 1). The error rates were all quite similar, ranging from .22 (no-theme, characteristic features) to .28 (mixed theme, idiosyncratic features). An analogous examination of confidence ratings also revealed no significant main effects or interactions (all Fs < 1). Thus, the two groups learned the features equally well.
Because we obtained a null result in this experiment, we conducted a power analysis to make sure our measure was sensitive enough to have detected a difference if one had existed (also, see the next experiment). Given the error terms obtained from our data, we could have found a significant result in learning times if the means had been 2.68 or more blocks apart. Note that this effect size is smaller than the observed differences between the intact and mixed theme learning times in both Experiments 1 and 2. Thus, the experiment was sensitive enough to find effects smaller than those obtained in previous experiments.
These results suggest that there is no significant disadvantage to having inconsistent knowledge relative to no knowledge. That is, thematically contradictory features are no worse than neutral, unrelated features. (However, we should note that the inconsistency used here was relatively mild, as it occurred across exemplars. Inconsistency within exemplars can slow category learning; see Murphy & Wisniewski, 1989; Wisnlewski, 1995.) With regard to Experiments 1 and 2, this means that the mixed theme groups were not suffering interference but that the intact theme group benefited from having a theme that was related to category membership. This result is analogous to a finding by Murphy and Allopenna (1994) in their Experiment 3. They compared a "domain consistent" condition with all rote features to a "meaningful" condition, which had conflicting features (analogous to the mixed theme condition bere). They also found no difference between the two but found that both were harder to learn than a condition with consistent knowledge. Murphy and Allopeuna's experiment differed from the present one in two important ways, however. First, as described previously, all of their category's features were involved in the conflicting knowledge, rather than just one per exemplar, as in the present mixed theme condition. Thus, their individual exemplars were also incoherent, not just inconsistent with one another. Second, the mixed theme condition of the present experiments used features from the same domain (i.e., vehicles, animals, or buildings), whereas the analogous condition in Murphy and Allopenna's study mixed features from completely different domains, making the concepts even more incoherent.
Given those differences, it is impressive that the present results and those of Murphy and Allopenna converge to suggest that having contradictory thematic features does not hurt learning relative to having no thematic features. That is, all these experiments suggest that the effect of knowledge is facilitative: A helpful theme aids subjects in learning the category, but a confused and inconsistent theme does not hurt learning. Given the counterintuitive nature of this result, we attempted to replicate it in the next experiment, adding the intact theme condition, so that we could simultaneously look for the usual knowledge effect (advantage of the intact theme condition) as well as any evidence of interference due to mixed themes. In addition, Experiment 4 investigated the time-course of the knowledge effect on learning, as we explain next.
Experiment 4
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that prior knowledge can aid category learning even when the exemplars to be learned contain miniroal amounts of thematic information (one knowledgerelated feature per exemplar). Because the intact theme categories were learned faster than the mixed theme categories, we have evidence that even small amounts of prior knowledge are useful. It is not clear from Experiments 1 and 2 how quickly knowledge influences category learning. Because we tested the features after the categories had been mastered, we only know what has been learned after several blocks of learning. As we will discuss, discovering when knowledge has its effects will constrain accounts of how it influences the learning of knowledge-related and rote features.
In past experiments in which all of the relevant features were connected by knowledge (Murphy & Allopeuna, 1994; Pazzani, 1991; Spalding & Murphy, 1996; Wattenmaker et al., 1986) , it would not be surprising if knowledge effects appeared very early. This is because any individual item reflected the theme (or lack thereof) fairly clearly. For example, a single item from Murphy and Allopeuna's experiment might include the features, "is underwater," "divers live there," and "fish are kept there as pets." This item alone could be enough to evoke the theme of an underwater building. In contrast, in the intact theme condition of the present experiments, one item might have "has thick walls," along with five features unrelated to the theme, and a different item encountered later might have "fish are kept there as pets," plus five unrelated features, and so on. In such a situation, noticing the theme could take considerable time.
Consider two possibilities of when the theme is identified. One is that subjects must first learn the categories to some degree before the theme-to-category relationship can be identified. It is only when one has learned that the Dax includes different items with the features "has thick walls," "divers live there," and "is underwater" that one can realize that membership in Daxes is related to the underwater building theme. Because each knowledge-related feature occurs so seldom (once per block), it may take a few blocks before subjects make this connection. At that point, subjects presumably undergo an "aha!" experience and then can categorize the items almost perfectly. The second possibility is that subjects notice the connection between a theme and some of the features immediately. However, they may not be able to perfectly categorize the items on this basis yet, because they may not correctly identify the theme in detail right away, or because they do not immediately recognize how all the knowledge-related features relate to the theme (Wisniewski & Medin, 1994) . For example, subjects might notice right away that one category has to do with divers and one with astronauts but not realize that the buildings are actually under water and floating in air. Complete identification of the theme--eventually resulting in perfect performance--could then accrue gradually with further learning.
These two possibilities suggest two different reasons for why the intact theme subjects seem to be learning the rote features as well as the mixed theme subjects do (a finding we will attempt to replicate in this experiment). If the themes are identified only after a fair amount of purely empirical learning, then the rote features must be learned during this initial stage before the themes are noticed. That is, prior to the "aha!" experience is a fairly standard empirical learning stage in which the intact theme subjects notice that some features are associated to each category. On the second view, a theme is identified quite quickly. In this case, the learning of rote features could be influenced by subjects' attempts to relate them to the theme. If subjects identify Daxes as a building where divers live, then they may try to use this information to interpret the rote features such as having venetian blinds or central heating. Clearly, this could only be possible if the themes are activated early in the learning process; if the theme comes all at once, in an "aha!" experience (after which the subject performs perfectly), there would be little time to integrate the features.
Thus, the present experiment examines when prior knowledge first affects learning, by administering the single-feature classification task after each block of learning. Finally, the no-theme condition was also included in this study to replicate Experiment 3 and to provide a comparison for the intact theme condition. If the effect of knowledge is primarily facilitative, then the no-theme categories should be harder to learn than the intact theme categories (which were not included in Experiment 3) and about as difficult as the mixed theme conditions.
Method
Subjects. Twenty-seven University of Illinois undergraduates participated either for class credit or pay.
Materials and procedure.
Three different category types were used in this experiment: Intact theme, mixed theme, and no theme, as in earlier experiments. Subjects completed alternating blocks of whole exemplar learning trials (as before) and speeded single-feature classifications (previously done only after learning was complete). As before, each learning block consisted of all 12 exemplars in a random order, and the singlefeature classification blocks consisted of all 22 individual features in a random order. The experiment ended after the single-feature classification test following the learning block on which the subject correctly categorized all 12 exemplars. The computer recorded RTs to the single-feature classifications, but the confidence measure used in Experiments 2 and 3 was not used here, in order to shorten the test blocks.
Results similar. (We should also point out that learning seemed to be a bit faster in this experiment than in the previous ones, probably because the single-feature tests after each block aided category learning, even though no feedback was provided in the tests.)
We were able to track the time course of the prior knowledge effects in the single-feature classification blocks after each learning block. Only the mixed and intact theme groups were included in this analysis, because the no-theme categories contained different idiosyncratic features than the other two conditions, making a meaningful comparison impossible. (And, of course, there was no way to compare rote and knowledge-related features in that condition.) The only difference between the intact and mixed theme categories was the distribution of the same idiosyncratic features across categories (see Table 1 ), so comparisons of single-feature classification between these conditions illuminate how prior knowledge is used over the course of learning without item confounds.
The single-feature RTs and error rates for the first and final blocks are presented in Table 3 . Analysis of the first-block RTs indicates a very early effect of prior knowledge. There was a significant interaction of category condition with feature type whereby intact theme and mixed theme subjects were equally fast at correctly categorizing characteristic features, but intact theme subjects were faster at correctly categorizing idiosyncratic features, F(1, 16) = 6.49, p < .05, MSE = 40,869. There were no significant main effects. The single-feature error data also had no main effects of category condition or feature type, but there was a marginally significant interaction between the two, F(1, 16) = 4.32, p < .06, MSE = .027. The intact and mixed theme groups performed similarly with characteristic features, but the intact theme subjects were much more accurate than mixed theme subjects on the idiosyncratic features, t(16) = 3.10,p < .01. Thus, the effect of knowledge appeared in the very fLrst block, after a single exposure to each item.
Within each condition, we can compare the degree to which the characteristic and idiosyncratic features were learned after one block. In light of the results of Experiment 2, we expected that This experiment had two main goals. First, we hoped to replicate the learning time differences found in the previous experiments. Second, we wished to determine how early in the learning trials knowledge has its effects. With regard to the ftrst question, the numbers of blocks taken to master the intact, mixed, and no-theme categories were entered into a one-way ANOVA. There was a main effect of category condition, F(2, 24) = 5.57, p < .05, MSE = 2.33. Post-hoc tests (Tukey's honestly significant difference, or HSD, p < .05) revealed that the intact theme categories were learned significantly faster than both the mixed theme and no-theme categories (mean blocks to learning = 2.67, 5.00, and 4.33, respectively), while there was no significant difference between the latter two. The HSD would have found a significant difference between the mixed theme and no-theme conditions as small as 1.64 blocks, which is much smaller than the differences found in Experiments 1 and 2. Thus, that null result cannot be due to lack of experimental sensitivity. Together, these findings replicate the learning results of the first three experiments. In particular, they again show that the effect of knowledge is facilitative rather than inhibitory, as the mixed and no-theme groups were quite intact theme subjects would learn the idiosyncratic (knowledgerelated) features better than the characteristic features but that the mixed theme subjects would not. Consistent with this prediction, the intact theme group was faster, t(8) = 4.30, p < .01, and made marginally fewer errors, t(8) = 1.95, p < .09, on idiosyncratic than characteristic features in the first block of single-feature classifications. Mixed theme subjects showed no differences between the two feature types in either accuracy or RTs. Together, these results suggest that prior knowledge is having an effect even after each knowledge-related feature had occurred only once. It was not feasible to repeat this same analysis for each subsequent block of single-feature trials because subjects dropped out of the learning trials differentially, depending on what condition they were in. For instance, one of the intact theme subjects had learned the categories perfectly after the first block, four had mastered the categories after two blocks, and eight had learned them after three blocks. In contrast, only two mixed theme subjects had learned the categories by three blocks, so a block-by-block comparison of the two conditions was not possible. Instead, we examined the singlefeature classifications for each subject's fmal block, as we did in Experiment 2. The means are shown in Table 3 . The ANOVA of RTs revealed a marginally significant interaction between category condition and feature type, F(1, 16) = 3.44, p < .09, MSE = 66,291. This interaction took the same form as the one found in the first block of single-feature trials: The groups performed similarly on characteristic features, but the intact theme subjects were marginally faster than mixed theme subjects on idiosyncratic ones, t(16) = 1.8, p < .10. Finally, the errors on the final block of single-feature classifications revealed a significant interaction between category condition and feature type, F(1, 16) = 14.68, p < .01, MSE = 0.01. Again, both groups performed similarly on characteristic features, but the intact theme subjects were much more accurate on idiosyncratic features than were mixed theme subjects, t(16) = 4.87, p < .001. In addition, there was a significant main effect of feature type in which more errors were made on characteristic than idiosyncratic features (.21 and .08 proportions of errors, respectively), F(1, 16) = 4.32, p < .001, MSE = 0.01. If we examine the performance of each group separately on the characteristic and idiosyncratic features, we fred a pattern similar to that seen after the first block, While the mixed theme group showed no differences in RT or accuracy to the characteristic and idiosyncratic features, the intact theme subjects were significantly more accurate at classifying idiosyncratic features than characteristic ones, t(8) = 4.76, p < .01 (the RT difference was not significant). All in all, these results show that intact theme subjects learned the idiosyncratic, thematic features better than the mixed theme subjects did, but that there was no difference in the characteristic, rote features. We postpone more detailed discussion of the results until after the next experiment.
Experiment 5
One result we have seen repeatedly in the experiments reported so far is that the intact theme subjects never performed significantly worse than the mixed theme subjects on the characteristic, knowledge-unrelated features. This result is somewhat surprising, especially considering that, at the time of the single-feature trials, the intact theme subjects had far fewer exposures to the exemplars than the mixed theme subjects had (because intact theme subjects learn the categories much faster than do mixed theme subjects). This result contradicts the attentional focus hypothesis that has been proposed for knowledge effects. Since these subjects were presumably using the themes to a great degree to learn the categories, they were not expected to be as accurate with the nonthematic features.
The intention of the single-feature tests was to compare the relative performance of the knowledge-based and rote features of two groups, in order to identify what each group had learned about the items. In particular, we have been asking whether knowledge helps in learning the rote and knowledge-related features. The results already answer the question for knowledge-related features, as intact theme subjects always performed better on them even with less exposure. The results are not so clear with the rote, characteristic features, however. The intact theme subjects were about the same as the mixed theme subjects on these features (usually nonsignificantly a bit worse), even though they had fewer learning trials with them. Thus, it is possible that they would have actually been better on the rote features if they had had equal amounts of learning. (Table 3 reveals something of a speedaccuracy tradeoff in the critical comparison, as intact theme subjects are faster but less accurate than mixed theme subjects on the characteristic features in the final block. This makes it difficult to compare the two groups.) Perhaps knowledge is actually helping the learning of rote features rather than simply not hurting it. Experiment 5 addresses this possibility by giving all subjects three blocks of learning trials, followed by the single-feature tests. This will allow us to compare absolute performance of the two groups when exposure is equated.
Method
Thirty University of Illinois undergraduates participated in this experiment for class credit or pay. The intact and mixed theme categories from the previous experiments were used in this experiment. The experiment consisted of learning blocks, as in the cartier experiments, followed by a test of single features. The only difference was that all subjects performed exactly three blocks of learning. The confidence measure used in Experiment 2 was used here as well.
Results
Because subjects all completed exactly three blocks, learning was measured only by the number of errors made during the learning trials. A 2 (knowledge condition) × 3 (domain) ANOVA on the total number of learning errors showed a marginal main effect of knowledge condition in which the intact theme subjects made fewer errors, M = 6.73, than the mixed theme subjects, M = 10.4, F(1, 24) = 4.10, p < .06, MSE = 24.57. This result is in line with the repeated observation of the superiority of consistent over inconsistent knowledge. It is not surprising that this effect is smaller than in prior experiments, given that subjects were stopped before they had made all the errors they would have. The critical question of interest in this experiment was the comparison between intact theme and mixed theme subjects' performance on the characteristic features in the single-feature test. There were no significant differences between the two groups' performance on the characteristic features as gauged by error rates, reaction times, or confidence ratings (see Table 4 ), all ps > .35. However, the usual superiority of the intact theme over the mixed theme condi- tions on the idiosyncratic features was replicated for all three measures (ps < .01). Thus, knowledge seems to aid the learning of thematic features but to have no effect, positive or negative, on rote features.
Discussion of Experiments 4 and 5
The learning results of Experiment 4 show a strong advantage for consistent prior knowledge. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that intact theme categories were easier to learn than mixed theme categories, which was again found here. However, it was unclear whether consistent knowledge would facilitate category learning relative to categories with no knowledge. Experiment 4 found that intact theme categories were indeed easier to learn than no-theme categories, suggesting that consistent prior knowledge is helpful relative to lack of knowledge and not only relative to inconsistent knowledge, as embodied in the mixed theme categories. Also, in a replication of Experiment 3, we found that inconsistent knowledge was essentially equivalent to having no knowledge at all. Thus, the knowledge effect seems to be facilitative, with little evidence that inconsistent knowledge (of the sort tested here) causes interference.
The single-feature classification results suggest that the advantages of consistent knowledge begin very early in learning. After just one block of exemplars, intact theme subjects showed faster classification and more accurate responses on the idiosyncratic, thematic features, whereas mixed theme subjects performed similarly on the thematic and rote features. This same pattern of results was obtained after each group had completed three learning blocks (Experiment 5), and after the categories had been mastered by both groups (end of learning, Experiments 2 and 4). The fact that differences emerged after the first block of learning indicates that many of the intact theme subjects noticed the themes as early as possible, after each thematic feature had only occurred once. This finding argues against the idea that knowledge effects occur only after some substantial amount of empirical learning has occurred. The intact theme subjects scored 86% correct on thematic features that they had viewed only one time. Clearly, the theme was helpful in learning these features, since it seems extremely unlikely that they would have learned most of the 12 idiosyncratic features after a single exposure (mixed in with 10 more frequent, characteristic features), based only on rote memory. Indeed, as Table 3 shows, the intact theme subjects' performance on idiosyncratic features after Block 1 is slightly better than that of the mixed theme subjects after their final block (on average, Block 5). Thus, the benefit knowledge confers at the very beginning is surprisingly large.
The speed and power of the knowledge effect suggest that learners are particularly susceptible to noticing and using the kinds of thematic connections that were tested in these experiments. They notice them as soon as possible and use them in learning feature-to-category connections, even though the knowledgerelated features form a small minority within any single exemplar. By the final block, the intact theme subjects are essentially perfect in classifying them.
Given these results, it is somewhat surprising that Experiment 4 again found (as in Experiment 2) that the intact theme subjects were no worse at learning the characteristic, rote features than the mixed theme subjects were. In Block 1, their performance was quite similar (see Table 3 ). In the final block, the intact theme group was slightly less accurate, but slightly faster in the feature classification test, neither difference reaching significance. The lack of any difference was replicated in Experiment 5 as well, when learning trials were equated. In short, it seems clear that knowledge is helping the intact theme group learn the thematic features but is not preempting or interfering with the learning of the nonthematic features, contrary to the predictions of attentional focus.
This pattern of results is consistent with the proposal that subjects attempt to relate all the category's features to the prior knowledge. First, we found knowledge effects at the very beginning of learning, so it is clear that the knowledge is activated before subjects have learned the rote features. Second, the consistent finding that intact theme subjects are no worse at learning the nonthematic features suggests that they may be recruiting the nonthematic features into the themes. Although learners are obviously using the themes in learning (as shown in both learning and single-feature data), other features are not disadvantaged, perhaps because some of these rote features are being assimilated into the theme. The final experiment seeks more direct evidence of such a process.
Experiment 6
Experiments 2, 4, and 5 found no significant differences between intact and mixed theme subjects' performance (in RTs or accuracy) on rote features, despite large differences in their performance on knowledge-related features. This occurred even when the intact theme subjects had fewer exposures to the exemplars than the mixed theme subjects did. Why do intact theme subjects learn these nonthematic features, when they could perfectly well categorize the items by focusing only on the thematic features? We suggested in the Discussion section of Experiment 2 that people might be incorporating the nonthematic, characteristic features into the themes. For example, upon learning that most of the tropical vehicles have vinyl seat covers, subjects might come to believe that vinyl seat covers are a good feature for vehicles used in warm climates, and they might infer a reason for this correlation (e.g., they allow better circulation than cloth seats would). If people make use of this kind of explanation process to guide their learning, then we should find this type of reasoning regardless of the particular features being learned. That is, if one subject learns that vinyl seat covers are usually found in tropical vehicles, she might construct an explanation for why this is so, but another subject who learns that cloth seat covers were usually found in tropical vehicles should devise a different rationale to explain the cooccurrence of these features (e.g., vinyl would get too hot in the tropics).
Previous experiments could not directly find evidence for such a process, since they only examined classification accuracy of the features. Experiment 6 tested this hypothesis more directly by sampling subjects' beliefs about the relations of the themes and rote features to see if any such incorporation had occurred. Subjects first went through a learning procedure identical to that of Experiments 1-3 but then were asked what they thought the real-life relations were between the themes and the nonthematic features, for example, whether a jungle vehicle would be more likely to have vinyl or cloth seats. (We took several steps to reduce the possibility that the results would be influenced by demand characteristics, as described in the Method section.) If subjects had inferred an explanation for the cooccurrence of vinyl seats and jungle vehicles, for example, they should then claim that jungle vehicles in real life would be more likely to have vinyl seats than cloth seats. Of course, it is possible that our choice of nonthematic features was biased toward one or the other theme, for example, perhaps people generally believe that vinyl seats are more appropriate to jungle vehicles. Thus, our design crossed the nonthematic characteristic features with the themes to see whether people devise explanations for the particular characteristic features they have learned. That is, equal numbers of subjects saw vinyl seats and cloth seats in jungle vehicles. We predicted that subjects would attempt to form explanations for whichever theme-feature correlation they encounter. If subjects do infer connections between the theme and nonthematic features, then this would provide evidence for recruiting the characteristic features into the theme, which could explain why the intact theme subjects learned these (a priori) nonthematic features fairly well in Experiments 2 and 4.
Method
Subjects. Thirty University of Illinois undergraduates participated in this experiment for either class credit or pay. Five subjects participated in each of six conditions. Materials. Only intact theme categories were used in this experiment. For each domain (animals, buildings, and vehicles), two different category pairs were formed by assigning the idiosyncratic features to different sets of characteristic features. For example, Table 1 shows a pair of intact theme categories with the characteristic feature value of 1 associated with the A theme and the characteristic feature value of 0 associated with the B theme. This was the structure for half of the category pairs. For the other half of the category pairs, we switched the idiosyncratic features such that the characteristic feature 1 was now associated with the B theme and the characteristic feature 0 was now associated with the A theme (i.e., we swapped the a's and b's in Table 1 ). Because there was no obvious thematic relationship between the characteristic and idiosyncratic features, this switch did not affect the thematic consistency of the categories and therefore was not expected to affect the initial learning process.
Procedure. The experiment consisted of two phases, a learning phase and a questionnaire phase. The learning phase was identical to that of Experiments 1-3. After completing one errorless run through the categories, subjects were told that the experiment was over, and they then completed a second experiment (a 5-min filler task of writing definitions for common words and then using those words in a sentence). Finally, subjects were presented with a questionnaire asking them about what kinds of features would be found in objects in the real world. The questionnaire was separated from the learning phase (which had been presented as a self-contained experiment) in order to foster the impression that the second part was not assessing what subjects learned in the first part but was a posttest of the properties of the stimuli. The instructions told the subjects that the categories they had learned earlier were from two different themes (e.g., space buildings and ocean buildings). Subjects were asked to decide which features would actually be found in these kinds of objects in the real world, and to provide justifications for their choices. They were explicitly told that we were not asking which features occurred with the themes presented in the earlier experiment but wanted to know their opinion about real-world objects. The questionnaire asked about each characteristic and idiosyncratic dimension twice, once from the perspective of each theme. For example, subjects were asked whether rugs or wall-to-wall carpeting would be more likely to appear in a space building on one trial, and in an ocean building on another trial. There were 22 items in the questionnaire. Subjects were allowed to circle both of the features if they could think of no reason why one would be favored over the other. This option was also intended to reduce any possibility that subjects would interpret the experiment as a memory test, since there was always a correct answer about which feature had occurred with the themes during that phase.
Results and Discussion
Since all the categories were in the intact theme condition, there was no comparison to be made in the learning trials. The primary question of this experiment has to do with the feature choices and justifications subjects made on the questionnaires. For each subject, we counted the number of choices that were consistent or inconsistent with the categories that subject had actually learned. (The means do not sum to the total number of choices possible, since subjects could and did also circle both items.) Repeatedmeasures ANOVAs with category consistency as a within-subjects factor were run separately for characteristic and idiosyncratic features. Since the idiosyncratic features were specifically designed to be thematic, this analysis was essentially a manipulation check. Accordingly, there was a highly significant main effect of consistency for the idiosyncratic features, whereby subjects chose many more consistent, M = 10.8 out of a possible 12, than inconsistent, M = 0.87 features, F(1, 29) = 417, p < .001, MSE = 3.55. This result confn'ms our intuition that the thematic features were seen as indicating the appropriate themes. For example, people agreed that "Drives in jungles" was a more likely feature for tropical vehicles than was "Drives on glaciers."
Our predictions were borne out by the characteristic features as well. Subjects chose more characteristic features that were consistent, M = 4.7 out of 10, rather than inconsistent, M = 3.2, with the categories they had learned, F(1, 29) = 4.66, p < .05, MSE = 6.92. That is, if a subject learned that rugs went in ocean buildings, then they were more likely to pick rugs than wall-towall carpeting as a feature of ocean buildings. This effect occurs on top of any real bias of these features for one or the other theme. If subjects believe that jungle vehicles generally have vinyl seats, this would correspondingly weaken a consistency effect of the sort found here, because for half the subjects, jungle vehicles would have had cloth seats.
We examined the subjects' justifications for any evidence that they were relying on a demand characteristic of consciously choosing the items that appeared together in the experiment. Across 660 such justifications, only 4, all from one subject, said "they went together in the experiment." The others were all based on the content of the features (e.g., "cloth seat covers would be better in the arctic because vinyl would get too cold"). Thus, by separating the test from the learning phase and explicitly instructing subjects not to simply reproduce what they learned, we were apparently successful in avoiding demand characteristics.
In summary, when subjects learned that a characteristic feature occurred in the same category as a theme, they were fairly likely to claim later that that feature more naturally belonged with the theme. This is what would be predicted if subjects had been attempting to integrate the thematic and nonthematic features. (It is possible that subjects constructed their justifications post hoc to explain what they had learned about the categories, but there is no direct evidence for this. The fact that subjects provided so many justifications when they could have given none also suggests that the feature-to-theme relations were rich.) Although the effect size is not overwhelming (a difference of about 1.5 features out of about 8 for which they expressed a preference), this is partly attributable to the fact that subjects do not learn all the characteristic features. As can be seen in Table 3 , intact theme subjects only learn about 73% of the nonthematic features (though they virtually never make mistakes on the thematic features). Obviously, subjects could not have integrated features that they had not learned. And as mentioned earlier, this effect must occur on top of any natural biases that exist in the stimuli, so finding a significant difference under these circumstances is impressive. It seems likely, then, that subjects are trying to integrate all the features of a category--not just those that are easily connected to the theme. This attempt may account in part for why intact theme subjects are no worse at learning the characteristic features even though they view them for fewer learning trials than the mixed theme subjects.
General Discussion

Effects of Minimal Knowledge
Throughout the experiments reported here, prior knowledge had strong effects on category learning, even though individual exemplars were mainly lists of rote properties with very few knowledgerelevant features: Each exemplar consisted of five nonthematic features and a single knowledge-related one. Because the themes depended on the relations of several features (e.g., thick walls are needed for a building that is found underwater in which divers live) occurring across items, no single exemplar evoked the theme on its own, unlike exemplars in much previous research. Instead, the themes could only be noticed by integrating different features across several exemplars. The result that intact theme categories, whose idiosyncratic features were all derived from the same theme within a category, were learned much faster than mixed theme categories, whose idiosyncratic features were derived from conflicting themes within each category, and no-theme categories, which contained no knowledge, shows that people are able to use their prior knowledge even in this relatively weak knowledge condition. Thus, it is not crucial that one's prior knowledge is related to all--or even most--of the features of some new object as long as there is some small amount of information that connects the new items to prior knowledge. This result is important, because it seems unlikely that real-world categories have features that are all related to some knowledge structure. At least some features are rote properties that just happen to be true of the category, for reasons that a learner does not know. The results of the present experiments show that knowledge is still helpful in such a situation. Moreover, Experiment 6 suggests that people may use available knowledge to help integrate the rote features into a coherent knowledge structure. Kaplan and Murphy (1999) reported experiments using a similar category structure in a category construction task. In this task, subjects study the exemplars for a fixed period of time without category labels. Then they are given the items on a set of cards and are asked to form two categories from them. Analogous to the present results, their subjects were more likely to form the correct, family-resemblance categories when the items had one knowledgerelated feature apiece. Thus, the results in these two tasks are generally consistent. However, insofar as the effects of these paradigms can be compared, the knowledge effect seems to be considerably larger in the present experiments using category learning. In Experiment 1, for example, knowledge cut learning time and errors to less than half. In Kaplan and Murphy's Experiment 1, only a third of the subjects in the intact theme condition sorted the items correctly (compared to no subjects in the mixed theme condition), so the majority of subjects did not use knowledge even when it was available. It seems likely that this difference is due to the nature of the two tasks. In category construction, there is no feedback about category membership, and subjects have only one chance to guess what the categories are. In a supervised learning task, subjects are required to learn the particular categories the experimenter has in mind, and they must conform to those categories as a result of feedback. Thus, the learning task is more difficult and constrained, leaving greater opportunity for knowledge to have an effect.
In short, the kinds of knowledge effects found in the two tasks are quite analogous, and the account given for each one reinforces the other. Although one cannot expect these two paradigms to yield identical results given their intrinsic differences, it is an important finding that minimal knowledge is quite helpful in both cases.
One reason why knowledge was helpful in this task may have been its perfect reliability: In the intact theme categories, the thematic features only appeared with the correct category. However, such regularity is not necessary in order to obtain knowledge benefits. Murphy and Kaplan (in press) found that even when most items had an invalid thematic feature, knowledge was helpful so long as it was generally reliable. Thus, the present results, together with Murphy and Kaplan's study, reveal that even small amounts of knowledge and imperfect knowledge can aid category learning. Since most knowledge is likely to be incomplete and occasionally faulty, these results are important for demonstrating that knowledge may have a significant effect on real-world learning.
Integration of Knowledge and Empirical Learning
The fact that knowledge aids category learning does not itself seem very difficult to explain. Presumably, the prior knowledge represents information that is already known and so does not need to be learned (although identifying exactly which knowledge is relevant to the category does require learning). However, the set of results found in this and in earlier studies of knowledge effects does not follow the most obvious line of reasoning. The attentional focus hypothesis proposes that once subjects identify the relevant knowledge, they use this to understand the category and to respond in the learning task. And accordingly, a number of investigators have argued that subjects should learn the knowledge-relevant properties of concepts and should show reduced learning for rote properties (Murphy & Allopenna, 1994; Pazzani, 1991) . However, this hypothesis does not seem able to account for the conjunction of three main findings of the present studies: (a) prior knowledge greatly speeds learning; (b) subjects with prior knowledge perform much better on knowledge-related than on rote features; and (c) subjects with prior knowledge perform just as well on rote features as do subjects without the knowledge. The problem for the attentional view (and, actually, every view that we know of that has been suggested to explain such knowledge effects) is that the first two phenomena suggest that subjects are relying on knowledgerelated properties, whereas the final one does not. Before discussing possible explanations of this pattern of results, we should emphasize that all three findings have been replicated a number of times in the present studies. The knowledge advantage in learning appeared in every experiment (Experiment 1 is the best estimate of the effect, because it did not limit learning time or remove subjects who did not learn). In every experiment, intact theme subjects showed an advantage for thematic over nonthematic features. The third finding, although we have stated it as a null result, actually received positive evidence in Experiments 2, 4, and 5 through the interaction of knowledge condition and item type (characteristic or idiosyncratic). In all of those experiments, the mixed theme subjects never had a reliable advantage in the characteristic features. This cannot be attributed to lack of power, since the same experiments showed reliable differences between the same two groups in the idiosyncratic features. Thus, all three phenomena received strong support in the experiments.
The problem with this configuration of results is that attention to knowledge-related features would seem to entail less learning of rote features. This has not only been argued on an informal basis (Murphy & Allopeuna, 1994) , it is a characteristic of error-driven learning algorithms in general (this is how they produce phenomena like blocking in classical conditioning, in which an alreadylearned association prevents the learning of a new association; Gluck & Bower, 1988) . One way to save the attentional focus idea was to propose that most of the learning of the rote features was taking place before the knowledge was activated and directing subjects' attention. However, this idea was ruled out by the results of Experiment 4, which showed significant knowledge effects after a single block of learning (with only a single exposure to each knowledge-related feature). This one block could not have provided a high level of learning of the rote features, because the mixed theme subjects required many more blocks to learn them.
In short, the present results disconfirm the proposal made by Murphy and Allopenna (1994) that learners use knowledge to short-circuit the onerous learning process. They proposed that subjects rely on knowledge once it is identified, because it provides a reliable way to categorize the items and prevents the need for further learning. However, the present experiments show that subjects in fact learn much about the category beyond the theme and the knowledge-related features. Similar suggestions by Kruschke (1993) and Pazzani (1991) suffer the same fate.
We propose that there is a much closer connection between the learning of the rote and knowledge-related features than one might expect. Although learners are clearly using their knowledge to acquire the categories (as revealed by learning times and feature posttests), they may also be using that knowledge to try to learn the rote features. This conclusion is similar to one that Wisniewski (1995) drew in his experiments on knowledge effects in category learning, although with rather different materials and tests. Wisniewski concluded that subjects were not relying only on their prior knowledge in learning the categories, nor were they applying the knowledge first, and using empirical learning techniques only when it failed. Instead, he supported an integrated learning view, in which prior knowledge and empirical learning interact during the learning process (see also Heit, 1994) .
In the present experiments, such integrated learning could take place by subjects attempting to relate all features to the theme--not just the knowledge-related ones. For example, they could be trying to discover links between being under water and having central heating. Such attempts could help them to learn that the underwater building has that property. Experiment 6 found some evidence for this proposal by showing that subjects later claimed that properties were more consistent with the theme they had been learned with. This finding echoes one obtained in the categoryformation paradigm by Kaplan and Murphy (1999) . Because no category names are provided during exposure in the construction task, there was no way to do the posttests performed in the present experiments: Those subjects could not be asked whether Daxes had central heating because they were never told what the two categories were. However, analogous questions were asked in those experiments about the statistical relation between the characteristic features and the thematic features--for example, whether central heating occurred in items with thick walls. Learners did in fact notice generalizations between the characteristic and thematic features, providing evidence that they were linking the rote features to the knowledge structures that the category evoked.
This proposal for how knowledge influences the learning of rote features is a new one, and it will require more evidence to be fully supported. The main contribution of the present experiments is to show that the simple attentional focus notion, although mentioned by a number of authors, does not seem to explain the results. This is not to say that there are no attentional effects in this paradigm, but simply that they will not be sufficient to explain the whole pattern of results. Instead, a more interactive learning process is required to explain the relation between knowledge-based and empirical learning. That relation remains one of the major issues in the psychology of concepts, as the present results show that even small amounts of knowledge have a profound effect on learning.
Implications for Similarity-Based Categorization Models
These results cannot easily be accounted for by traditional "similarity-based" models of category learning, such as those based on Rosch and Mervis's (1975) prototype view or Medin and Schaffer's (1978) exemplar view. In the first, each feature is treated as a token value, and similarity is calculated as a function of the number of matching and mismatching values. In a straightforward application of such procedures, the mixed theme and intact theme structures would have identical similarities. These categories were identical for five out of six values of each item (the characteristic features). Since the remaining feature was idiosyncratic to each exemplar, it did not match any other feature in either condition. Thus, the family resemblance structures were the same across conditions. Feature-based similarity metrics in general cannot explain the impressive differences between the conditions, since the feature overlap pattern of each exemplar was identical across conditions. (We discuss more elaborate feature approaches below.)
In other similarity-based theories, object similarity is partly determined by the similarity of mismatching features. For example, Medin and Schaffer (1978) pointed out that if a red exemplar were remembered, a new exemplar that was orange would be somewhat different, but one that was green would be very different. Thus, they used a continuous value of similarity for each dimension to indicate how closely two features matched. One might attempt to use such a technique here (as suggested by a reviewer) to try to explain why the intact theme categories were so much easier to learn. Such an attempt would not work, however, because the different features of the themes were not on the same dimension. That is, "thick walls" and "divers live there" (features from the underwater building) come from entirely different dimensions, and so they would not be seen as similar (or dissimilar) in any approach in which items are compared along identical dimensions. This kind of rule is used by most exemplar and connectionist approaches to category learning: It is matches or mismatches within a dimension that determine similarity (see Lassaline & Murphy, 1998 , for discussion).
There is a clear sense, of course, in which "thick walls" and "divers live there" seem to go together. But that sense is exactly the knowledge structure that relates them (the underwater building theme), rather than similarity as specified in categorization models. Bassok and Medin (1997) have found that subjects will rate very different items that are thematically related as being more similar than items that are not. However, as they noted, this result is not one that any current theory of similarity can explain. 4
One could also propose that subjects construct a new feature or dimension during learning, something like "suitability for an underwater building" or "predatory animal characteristic." With these constructed features, similarity metrics could now demonstrate higher similarity for the intact theme than for the mixed theme condition. However, because such features are totally parasitic on identifying the themes that relate the features, they rely on people's knowledge rather than explaining or omitting it. Such attempts to explain the results use similarity in the circular sense that has been criticized by past writers (Goodman, 1972; Murphy &Medin, 1985) --figuring out how the category exemplars are similar is tantamount to learning the category. Of course, none of this denies that similarity might be useful in learning some categories or some part of many categories, for example, the mixed theme and no-theme conditions in our experiments. However, vague statements that knowledge simply increases similarity within categories do not seem consistent with present models of similarity when they are spelled out. Instead, the results support recent suggestions that similarity-based and theory-based approaches will each be necessary to explain category learning, rather than one of them replacing the other (Murphy, 1993, in press; Wisniewski, 1995; Wisniewski & Medin, 1994) .
Finally, even if a similarity metric could be found that predicts a difference between the intact and mixed theme conditions, it would still be an important and surprising finding that a small amount of knowledge has such a strong effect, cutting learning time in half. Although the theme is represented in only one feature per item, and there are five more frequent features that are statistically related to the category, subjects apparently prefer to use the theme when possible, as shown by faster category learning and greater accuracy for thematic features by intact theme subjects. Empirical similarity seems to be overwhelmed by the knowledge involved in the theme, even though the knowledge was represented in a single feature per object. This conclusion is echoed in other recent results: When subjects have the choice of using knowledge or the statistical structure of the category in making typicality judgments, the knowledge tends to win (Spalding & Murphy, 1999; Wisniewski, 1995) . Thus, there is apparently something extremely compelling about the use of knowledge that may not be explainable within theories of concept learning, but instead may relate to motivational or more general cognitive goals (see Gopnik, 1998; Medin & Ortony, 1989) . That is, perhaps people seek a simple, rational explanation for category membership and will construct such explanations even when other statistical predictors of category membership are readily available.
4 Some models of categorization start with subjects' similarity ratings of the items and use these to predict learning or categorization--most notably, the Generalized Context Model (GCM, Nosofsky, 1991) . It is sometimes suggested that such models can explain the results without recourse to people's world knowledge. However, as has been pointed out (e.g., Murphy, 1993) , the similarity ratings themselves involve this knowledge: If subjects rate "thick walls" and "divers live there" as being similar, this must be by virtue of their common involvement in a knowledge structure. Thus, although a formal model that starts with similarity ratings might be able to predict our results, since the similarity ratings use people's knowledge, the model is not actually explaining the data without recourse to knowledge. It is, of course, possible that models like the GCM are correct when such knowledge structures are taken into account; our point is only that approaches that do not mention knowledge are unlikely to explain the results.
